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Abstract
This paper studies fertility choices and fertility policies when chil-
drens earning abilities are random and parents are altruistic. We char-
acterize equilibrium allocations arising in endowment economies with
either complete or incomplete markets. Both models can replicate a
number of empirical regularities, such as inequality, social mobility
and fertility decreasing with ability, but the incomplete markets model
provides a number of more plausible predictions. We nd that fertil-
ity policies are generally welfare detrimental in our models even when
fertility is ine¢ ciently high.
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1 Introduction
At least since Malthus it has been recognized that high fertility rates are
associated to poverty. Such association motivates many family planning
programs around the world that seek to reduce fertility as a way to alleviate
poverty.1 Understanding the link between poverty and fertility, and more
generally, between inequality and fertility is an important part of the theory
of distribution.
This paper studies fertility choices and fertility policies in economies
where the underlying force driving inequality, poverty, social mobility and
fertility di¤erentials is uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. Our model integrates
two leading streams of the literature on inequality and fertility. One the
one hand, inequality and social mobility is driven by idiosyncratic shocks,
as in Huggett (1993) or Aiyagari (1994). On the other hand, fertility is
purely motivated by altruistic reasons, as in Barro and Becker (1989) and
Becker and Barro (1988). Individuals in our models are fully rational, altru-
istic toward their descendants, and heterogeneous in their abilities. Earning
abilities are randomly determined at birth and potentially correlated with
parental abilities. Insurance markets are available but parents cannot leave
negative bequests to their children. Altruistic models with idiosyncratic risk
are central to modern macroeconomics, particularly when studying issues of
inequality and redistribution, but with the important exception of Alvarez
(1999), these models assume exogenous fertility. This paper is the rst to
provide a characterization of the endowment version of a Bewley economy
extended to include endogenous fertility.2
The rst main contribution of the paper is to characterize complete mar-
kets allocations in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks and endogenous fertil-
ity. Surprisingly, while perfect risk sharing and at consumption are optimal
when fertility is exogenous, they are not optimal when fertility is endoge-
nous. Instead consumption and fertility remain stochastic in the complete
markets economy. The reason is that when a life is costly to create, optimal
consumption is an utilization rate and the higher the net cost of creating a
new life the higher its utilization rate, as shown by Barro and Becker (1989).
Since the net cost of a child is not constant in our environment, as it is tied
1For example, a United Nations Population Fund pamphlet asserts that "e¤ective fam-
ily planning programmes targeted to meet the needs of poor populations can reduce the
fertility gap between rich and poor people, and make a powerful contribution to poverty re-
duction and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals." Reported by UNPF
at http://www.unfpa.org/rh/planning/mediakit/docs/sheet4.pdf. Retrieved April 2 2014.
2See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 18) for a presentation of Bewley models.
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to both the parents and the childs abilities, then neither at consump-
tion nor at fertility is optimal. We also show that the complete markets
model predicts a negative relationship between fertility and parental ability,
inequality and social mobility. However, we also document some key coun-
terfactual implications. For example, the model predicts that all children
of the same parent have the same consumption, that the actual ability of
an individual does not a¤ects his/her own consumption, or that maximum
fertility is often optimal for plausible calibrations of the income process.
We then proceed to characterize the incomplete markets economy, one
that arises when the non-negative bequest constraint binds. The model can
replicate a number of stylized facts: inequality, persistence as well as social
mobility, and fertility decreasing with ability. The equilibrium is character-
ized by a Markov branching process satisfying the Conditional Stochastic
Monotonicity property. This means that if a kid from a poor family and a
kid from a rich family both fall into one of the poorest classes, it is more
likely that the poor kid will be poorer than the rich kid. But the model also
requires a signicant degree of social mobility in order to rationalize why
the poor have more children. Absent social mobility, fertility rates would be
equal among the poor and the rich. Furthermore, signicant social mobility
is a distinguishing feature of the data.
A negative relationship between fertility and ability is not simple to ob-
tain within dynastic altruistic models, as discussed by Jones, Schoonbroodt
and Tertilt (2011). Our explanation for the negative relationship is novel
and the second main contribution of the paper. It arises from the inter-
play of two opposites forces. On the one hand, higher ability individuals
face a larger opportunity cost of having children as children take valuable
parental time. On the other hand, higher ability individuals enjoy a larger
benet of having children when abilities are intergenerationally persistent
because the utility of a child is positively related to parental ability. We
nd that the e¤ect of ability on the marginal cost dominates its e¤ect on
the marginal benet if the intergenerational persistence of abilities is not
perfect. Regression to the mean in abilities means that low ability parents
expect their children to be, on average, of higher ability while high ability
parents expect their children to be of lower ability. This explains why fer-
tility decreases with ability, and income, in a fully rational, homothetic and
altruistic environment.
Golosov, Jones and Tertilt (2007) have shown that allocations are e¢ -
cient in frictionless Barro-Becker models. Of particular interest is whether
fertility is ine¢ ciently high or ine¢ ciently low when markets are incom-
plete. We show analytically that steady state fertility can be ine¢ ciently
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high when children are a net nancial cost to parents and markets are in-
complete. In that case, binding bequest constrains prevent early generations
from extracting resources from later generations making future generations
e¤ectively richer. Since fertility is a normal good, the fertility of early gener-
ations falls while fertility of later generations, and in particular steady state
fertility, increases. Providing conditions under which fertility is ine¢ ciently
high in incomplete markets economies is the third main contribution of the
paper. Our paper complements Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014) who have
shown that fertility is ine¢ ciently low for early generations.
Finally, we study the consequences and optimality of fertility policies,
such as family planning programs aiming at reducing fertilities rates. We
show that policies restricting the fertility of the poor result in a sequence of
income distributions that dominates the original distribution in all periods
in the rst order stochastic sense. In particular, average income and con-
sumption increase in all periods. This result arises from two forces. First,
average ability of (born) individuals increases because the poor has pro-
portionally more low ability children as a result of the assumed conditional
stochastic monotonicity property. Second, consumption and income of the
poor strictly increases because they spend less time and resources raising
children. These results seemingly provide the theoretical support to family
planning programs seeking to reduce the fertility of the poor (Chu and Koo
1990).
In spite of these positive implications, the fourth main result of the pa-
per is to show that fertility restrictions of any type, not only for the poor,
unequivocally reduce individual and social welfare in our model, even when
fertility is ine¢ ciently high. As we show, a policy that restricts fertility
reduces the set of feasible choices and invariably reduces welfare of all indi-
viduals in all generations, even those whose fertility is not directly a¤ected.
This is because altruistic parents care not only about their own consumption
and fertility but also care about the consumption and fertility of all their
descendants. Regardless of current ability there is a positive probability
that a descendant of the dynasty will fall into the group directly a¤ected
in nite time. Furthermore, the welfare of those individuals who are not
born under the new policy also falls, or at least does not increase. Social
welfare falls because the welfare of all individuals, born and unborn, either
falls or remain the same. This is the case, for example, if social welfare is
dened as classical (Bentham) utilitarianism, a weighted sum of the welfare
of all present and future individuals. The result also holds for versions of
classical utilitarianism that are consistent with the Barro-Becker concept of
diminishing altruism. An interpretation of our results is that the positive
4
e¤ect on welfare of fertility restrictions, namely higher average consumption,
is dominated by the negative e¤ect of a smaller dynasty size.
If social welfare is dened as average (Mills) utilitarianism rather than
classical utilitarianism, social welfare could increase even if the welfare of
all individuals falls if population falls even more. In this case, the net e¤ect
of fertility restrictions on social welfare depends on the relative strength of
two opposite forces. On the one hand, distributions of abilities and income
improve for all periods. On the other hand, welfare of all individuals fall.
We present two analytical cases in which the later force dominates and hence
social welfare dened as average welfare falls not only in present value but
also for all periods. Our quantitative exercises also show that these results
hold more generally.
The negative impact of fertility policies on individualswelfare applies
not only to policies aiming at reducing fertilities, but also to policies com-
pelling individuals to increase their fertilities. An example of such policy
is the seemingly o¢ cial Chinese policy of stigmatizing unwed women older
than 27 as leftover women".3
We also study the e¤ects on steady state social welfare of taxes or sub-
sidies seeking to increase or reduce the cost of raising children using a cali-
brated version of the model. The government is required to run a balanced
budget. The results suggest steady state average social welfare could be
increased but only by a very small tax, say one less than 2% the time cost of
raising every child. Out of this range, neither tax nor subsidy would improve
social welfare. The consequence on individual welfare varies across ability
types and is determined by the magnitude of the tax/subsidy.
In addition to the papers already mentioned, our paper is related to
Alvarez (1999). He studies an economy with idiosyncratic shocks, incomplete
markets and endogenous fertility choices by altruistic parents but does not
study the high fertility of the poor nor the consequences of fertility policies.
Our incomplete markets economy is a version of his model, one with non-
negative bequest constraints. In equilibrium no individual leaves positive
bequests. This is a stronger degree of market incompleteness than that in
Alvarez. Similar degree of market incompleteness is exploited by Krusell et
al. (2011) to obtain closed form solution for asset prices in a Huggett (1993)
model. Similarly, we are able to derive various closed form solutions and
provide analytical proofs of the welfare e¤ects of various fertility policies.
Our paper is also related to Hosseini et al. (2013) who study a related
3Fincher, Leta Hong (12 October 2012). "OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR; Chinas Leftover
Women". The New York Times. Retrieved 29 March 2014.
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problem using an optimal contracting approach, and to Sommer (2013) who
studies fertility in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks but parents are not
dynastically altruistic as in Barro and Becker.
There is a related literature that studies fertility policies in general equi-
librium. A recent example is Liao (2013) who studies the One Child Policy
using a calibrated deterministic dynastic altruism model with two types of
individuals, skilled and unskilled, in the spirit of Doepke (2004). Although
Liaos model can generate fertility di¤erentials, Doepke (2004) documents
that this channel alone is relatively weak. Part of the issue is that the model
only generates upward mobility in equilibrium. Our model, in contrast, gen-
erates signicant upward and downward mobility that can lead to signicant
fertility di¤erentials. The mechanisms are di¤erent and therefore comple-
mentary. We are also able to derive sharp analytical results. For example,
we prove that fertility reducing policies, like the one child policy, decrease
every individuals welfare for sure while Liaos calibrated result suggests its
true for almost all generations but not all.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes a simple
deterministic model of fertility. We show that when children are a net nan-
cial cost to parents and markets are incomplete then steady state fertility is
ine¢ ciently high. Section 3 introduces idiosyncratic shocks into the model.
We characterize the optimal fertility as well as its relationship with earning
abilities. Section 4 studies the e¤ect of fertility restriction policies on in-
dividual and social welfare. Numerical simulations, policy experiments and
robustness checks are performed in section 5. Section 6 concludes. Proofs
are in the Appendix.
2 A deterministic model
It is convenient to consider rst a deterministic version of the model. We
use the model to show analytically under what conditions fertility may be
ine¢ ciently high when markets are incomplete. A similar result is obtained
for the full model but using numerical simulations. Schoonbroodt and Tertilt
(2014) have shown that, under certain assumptions, incomplete markets
models can result in ine¢ ciently low fertility. In those cases, policies directed
to promote higher fertility may be welfare enhancing. We show that, under
4Another related paper is Moav (2005). In his model, individuals exhibit warm-glow
altruism, and comparative advantage in the education of children explains di¤erential
fertility rates among rich and poor individuals as well as the persistence of poverty. He
does not study fertility policies and social mobility does not occur in equilibrium.
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di¤erent assumptions, incomplete markets models can result in ine¢ ciently
high, not low, fertility. If that is the case then policies limiting fertility
could, in principle, be welfare improving. As we later show, this is not the
case. Restricting fertility in incomplete markets models, even if fertility is
ine¢ ciently high, is generally welfare detrimental.
The key assumption explaining why fertility could be ine¢ ciently low
or ine¢ ciently high is whether children are a net nancial cost or a net
nancial gain to parents. When children are a net nancial gain, as in
Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014) or Cordoba and Ripoll (2014), then market
incompleteness generates ine¢ ciently low fertility. But when children are
a net cost, as in Barro and Becker (1989) and Becker and Barro (1988),
then market incompleteness generates ine¢ ciently high steady state fertility.
Short term fertility, on the other hand, in particular the fertility of the rst
generation, is ine¢ ciently low under market incompleteness regardless of
whether children are a net nancial cost or benet.
The deterministic models of this section do not generate a negative rela-
tionship between fertility and income. Therefore, they do not help to ratio-
nalize the negative fertility-income relationship nor the high fertility of the
poor. The model in the next section, with idiosyncratic shocks, can generate
a negative relationship between fertility and income as well as ine¢ ciently
high fertility rates.
2.1 Complete markets
Individuals live for two periods, one as a child and one as an adult. Children
do not consume. The lifetime utility of an adult individual, or just an
individual, at time t is of the Barro-Becker type
u (ct) +  (nt)Ut+1; t = 0; 1; 2;    ;
where u (c) = c
1 
1  ;  2 (0; 1) ; is the utility from consumption, n is the
number of children and  (n) = n1 "; satisfying  2 (0; ),  (n) < 1, and
n  n:  (n) is the weight that parents attach to the welfare of their n
children and Ut+1 is the welfare of an individual at t + 1. The upper limit
on  is needed for an interior solution of fertility, as discussed in Barro and
Becker (1988). The upper limit on  (n) is required to guarantee bounded
utility.
Individuals are endowed with one unit of time that is used either to
work or to raise children. An adults labor supply is lt = 1   nt; where 
is the time cost of raising a child. In additional to labor income, individuals
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receive transfers, or bequest, from their parents in the amount bt. Let w be
the wage rate per unit of labor supply and r be the interest rate at time.
An individuals budget constraint is given by
w (1  nt) + (1 + r) bt  ct + ntbt+1:
The maximum number of children, n; needs to satisfy two restrictions.
First, n  1= is required so that parents labor supply, 1  nt; is nonneg-
ative. Second,  (n) < 1 implies n < 
1
" 1 : These restrictions are satised
if 1 " > : A nal assumption is required so that maximum fertility is not
always optimal: 
1
" (1 + r)
1
" < n:
Barro and Becker (1989) characterized optimal consumption and fertility
allocations, given prices and b0, of the sequence version of the problem above
under the assumption (1 + r)w > w. This assumption requires children to
be a net nancial burden to parents. The following proposition characterizes
optimal allocations.
Proposition 1 If (1 + r)w > w then the optimal solutions for t  1 are
given by
cCt =
1  
   " [(1 + r)w   w]
and
nCt = 
1
" (1 + r)
1
" :
If (1 + r)w < w the optimal solutions for t  1 satisfy nt = n and ct+1ct =
(n "(1 + r))1=.
The rst part of the Proposition was proven by Barro and Becker (1989)
while the second part is proven in the Appendix. According to the propo-
sition, if (1 + r)w > w then there is no transitional dynamics after the
rst period, consumption is proportional to the net cost of raising a child,
and fertility is proportional to the interest rate but independent of wage
income. However, if w > (1 + r)w then maximum fertility is optimal
and the economy is always in transition, except if parameters are such that
n "(1+r) = 1. Maximum fertility is optimal because children earn enough
income to compensate their parents for the costs of raising them and such
compensation scheme is possible when markets are complete.
2.2 Incomplete markets
Consider now an incomplete markets case. Specically, suppose bequests are
constrained to be larger than certain amount, b. This is a natural restriction
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because parents are legally unable to leave debts to their children. The rst
order condition for optimal bequests can be written as a standard Euler
equation but across generations:
ntu
0 (ct)   (nt)u0 (ct+1) (1 + r) with equality if bt+1 > b: (1)
The left hand side of this equation is the cost of endowing n children with
additional db bequests per-child while the right hand side is the benet.
Denote nI the steady state fertility in the incomplete markets model. The
following proposition states that fertility is higher in the incomplete markets
model when children are a net cost to parents.
Proposition 2 Suppose (1 + r)w > w. Then nI  nC .
Proof. In steady state, equation (1) simplies to 1   (1 + r)  nI " or
nI   1" (1 + r) 1" = nC :
The intuition for this key result is the following. When bequest con-
straints bind, early generations cannot extract as much resources from later
generations. Since children are normal goods, this redistribution of resources
from early to later generations reduces fertility at early times but makes fu-
ture generations e¤ectively richer and therefore increases fertility at later
times. The assumption (1 + r)w > w is important because in that case
nC is the relevant fertility when markets are complete. Otherwise, maxi-
mum fertility is optimal in the complete markets case and therefore larger
or equal than the incomplete markets case.
The results above show that incomplete markets models may produce
ine¢ ciently high steady state fertility. In those instances policies seeking to
reduce fertility may be welfare enhancing. The ndings also put in context of
the results of Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014). Their study is related with
cases where children are a nancial gain to parents and therefore market
incompleteness generates too little fertility. It is also the case that even
when children are a net nancial cost, fertility by early generations may be
ine¢ ciently low. But over the longer term, ine¢ ciently high fertility arises
when markets are incomplete and children are a net nancial cost.
Whether children are a nancial benet or cost is an open question.
Cordoba and Ripoll (2014) nd that children in the U.S. are likely a net
nancial benet. Lee (2000) estimates intergenerational transfers for di¤er-
ent societies and nds that lifetime transfers run from children to parents in
relative rich societies, and from parents to children in relative poor societies.
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The results of this section take prices as given. In that sense, they cor-
respond to either partial equilibrium or to a small open economy. The Ap-
pendix shows that these results can also be obtained in general equilibrium.
A limitation of the models so far is that they are silent about why fertility
rates are larger among poorer individuals, a key motivating for many family
planning policies. The next section shows that an extension of the model
that allows for idiosyncratic shocks can explain this regularity.
3 Idiosyncratic shocks
This section introduces idiosyncratic shocks into the model of the previous
section. We consider complete markets and incomplete markets arrange-
ments. Models with idiosyncratic risk are central in modern macroeco-
nomics, particularly when studying issues of inequality and redistribution
but, with the exception of Alvarez (1999), there exists no dynastic altru-
istic models with endogenous fertility. Given the focus of family planning
policies on poverty and inequality reduction, it is natural to study those
issues within a standard model where inequality is ultimately the result of
idiosyncratic risk.
The remaining of the paper derives a series of novel results for what can
be called Bewley models with endogenous fertility. A key contribution is to
show that a negative relationship between fertility and income arises natu-
rally both in the complete and incomplete markets versions of the models.
We also show that the complete markets model has some counterfactual
predictions, and focus the rest of the discussion in the incomplete markets
version.
3.1 Environment
Assume there is not aggregate uncertainty, goods are perishable, all infor-
mation is public, and markets open every period.
3.1.1 Evolution of abilities
Consider an endowment economy populated by a large number of dynas-
tic altruistic individuals who live for two periods, one as a child and one
as an adult. Children do not consume. Individuals di¤er in their labor
endowments, or earning abilities. Let 
  f!1; !2; :::; !Kg be the set
of possible earning abilities, where 0 < !1 < ::: < !K : Earning abili-
ties are drawn at the beginning of the adult life from the Markov chain
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M(!0; !) = Pr(!t+1 = !0j!t = !) where !t is the ability of the parent and
!t+1 is the ability of the child. We use the following assumption, due to
Chu and Koo (1990), to guarantee intergenerational persistence of abilities
in the rst order stochastic sense.
Assumption 1 Conditional Stochastic Monotonicity (CSM):PI
i=1Mi1PJ
j=1Mj1

PI
i=1Mi2PJ
j=1Mj2
 ::: 
PI
i=1MiKPJ
j=1MjK
; 1  I  J  K:
Assumption 1 means that if a low ability kid and a high ability kid both
fall into one of the lowest ability classes, it is more likely that the kid born
by a low ability parent be endowed with a lower ability than the kid born
by a high ability parent. CSM implies rst order stochastic dominance. To
see this notice that when J = K, the condition becomes:
IX
i=1
Mi1 
IX
i=1
Mi2  ::: 
IX
i=1
MiK , 1  I  K:
Two examples of Markov chains satisfying Assumption 1 are an i.i.d. process
and quasi-diagonal matrices of the form:
M =
26666664
a+ b c 0 0 :: 0 0
a b c 0 :: 0 0
0 a b c :: 0 0
:: :: :: :: :: 0 0
0 0 0 0 a b c
0 0 0 0 0 a b+ c
37777775 :
where (a; b; c) 0; a+ b+ c = 1 and b > 0:5:
Assume further thatM has a unique invariant distribution, , satisfying:
 (!j) =
X
!i2

 (!i)M(!j ; !i) for all !j 2 
: (2)
Let !t = [!0; !1; :::; !t] 2 
t+1 denote a particular history of ability realiza-
tions up to time t. We call !t a family history or a family branch. With
some abuse of notation, let !t =
 
!t 1; !t

for t > 1 and !0 = !0.
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3.1.2 Individual resources
The technology of production is linear in ability: one unit of labor produces
one unit of perishable output. The total resources available to an individual
of ability !t at time t are labor income !t (1  nt) and transfers from
their parents. Let ct
 
!t

and nt
 
!t

denote consumption and fertility of
an individual whose family history is !t: Let bt
 
!t

denote transfers, or
bequests, received from parents.5 Resources are used to consume and to
leave transfers to children. Insurance market exists as parents can leave
bequests contingent on the ability of their children. Let qt(!t; !i) be the
time t price of a contingent asset bt+1
 
!t; !i

that delivers one unit of
consumption at t+ 1 contingent on !t+1 = !i given family history !t. The
budget constraint of an individual at time t with history !t is:
ct
 
!t

+nt
 
!t
 KX
i=1
qt(!
t; !i)bt+1
 
!t; !i
  !t  1  nt  !t+bt  !t : (3)
3.1.3 Aggregate resources
Let N0
 
!0
  1: Nt  !t = Nt 1  !t 1nt 1  !t 1M (!t; !t 1) is the pop-
ulation size at time t of a particular branch of the family tree, the one
described by !t: Assume goods are perishable, total consumption cannot
exceed the total endowment of the economy at any point in time:X
!t2
t+1
Nt
 
!t
 
!t
 
1  nt
 
!t
  ct  !t  0 for all t.
3.1.4 Preferences
The lifetime utility of an individual born at time t is of the Barro-Becker
expected-utility type:
u
 
ct
 
!t

+
 
nt
 
!t

Et

Ut+1
 
!t+1
 j!t , t = 0; 1; 2;    (4)
where u (c) and  (n) satisfy the same properties of the previous section,
Et is the mathematical expectation operator conditional on the information
up to time t and EtUt+1 is the expected utility of individuals in the next
generation.
5We denote bt bequest for short. This bequest includes all net transfers from a parent
to each of his/her adult child. In particular, it includes inter vivos transfers.
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3.1.5 Market arrangements
All markets are competitive and insurance prices are actuarially fair. Let
pt =
P
i qt(!
t; !i) be the price of a riskless bond. Under the assumption of
no aggregate uncertainty, pt = p: The riskless interest rate is then given by
1 + r = 1=p. Furthermore, actuarially fair prices must satisfy the arbitrage
condition
qt(!
t; !i) = pM (!i; !t) : (5)
so that qt(!t; !i) = q(!t; !i):
We study two di¤erent market arrangements. We rst consider a com-
plete markets economy in which families are only subject to natural debt
limits, limits that prevent Ponzi schemes but that do not bind in equilib-
rium. In particular, parents can leave negative bequests to their children
in a complete markets economy. We also consider an incomplete markets
economy in which parents cannot leave negative bequests to their children.
In particular, in this case we assume:
bt+1
 
!t; !t+1
  0 for all !t 2 
t+1; !t+1 2 
 and all t  0: (6)
3.2 Complete markets
3.2.1 Optimal consumption and fertility
Consider rst the complete markets economy. We nd convenient to write
the problem recursively. Let Vt
 
bt; !
t

be the maximum lifetime utility of a
time t adult with family history !t. Then
Vt
 
bt; !
t

= max
nt2[0;n];bt+1(!t;!i)
u (ct) + n
1 "
t Et

Vt+1
 
bt+1
 
!t+1

; !t+1
 j!t
subject to
ct + nt
KX
i=1
q(!t; !i)bt+1(!
t; !i)  !t (1  nt) + bt for all t and
 
!t; !i

:
(7)
The following Proposition generalizes Proposition 1 for the case of stochastic
earning abilities and children being a net nancial costs to parents. Proofs
are in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Suppose (1 + r)!t > E (!t+1j!t) for all !t: Then the op-
timal interior solutions for consumption and fertility are given by:
ct+1 = c (!t) =
1  
   " [(1 + r)!t   E (!t+1j!t)] for all t  0 (8)
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and
nt = n (!t 1; !t) = 
1
" (1 + r)
1
"

(1 + r)!t 1   E (!tj!t 1)
(1 + r)!t   E (!t+1j!t)

"
for all t  1:
(9)
If (1 + r)!t > E (!t+1j!t) for some t; then the optimal fertility at time t
is n:
According to the proposition, consumption of all generations, except
the rst one, is proportional to the net expected nancial cost of raising a
child, (1 + rt)!t   E (!t+1j!t) : Equation (8) implies that individual con-
sumption is a random variable, one that increases with the ability of the
parent and falls with the expected ability of the individual. The random-
ness of consumption is perhaps surprising because with exogenous fertility
consumption it is not random but constant. In that case, individuals are
able to insure all idiosyncratic risk, and consumption obeys the permanent
income hypothesis.
But consumption in the endogenous fertility case obeys a completely
di¤erent logic. In contrast to the exogenous fertility case, the existence of
a next period consumer, the child, is not guaranteed nor costless. When a
life is costly to create, optimal consumption becomes an utilization rate and
the higher the net cost of creating a new variety, a new child, the higher
the utilization rate. Furthermore, if costs and/or benets of raising a child
is random so is consumption. The randomness of consumption also implies
that there exists social mobility in the endogenous-fertility complete-markets
model. Equation (8) also implies that all children of the same parent has
the same consumption, and that the actual ability of an individual does
not a¤ects his/her own consumption. These two predictions are particularly
problematic. Evidence shows that there exists signicant consumption in-
equality among siblings and that consumption increases with earnings (e.g.,
Mulligan 1997 and Gaviria 2002).
The solution for optimal fertility described by equation (9) is a restate-
ment of the intergenerational Euler equation, u0(ct) = n "t (1 + rt+1)Etu0(ct+1),
where n "t is the average degree of altruism: Fertility, rather than con-
sumption, now plays the key role of smoothing family welfare. If parental
consumption is high while children consumption is low, then high fertility
is required to smooth family utility intertemporally. More precisely, equa-
tion (9) shows that fertility depends negatively on the ability of the parent,
and positively on the ability of the grandparent. The model thus provides
a novel explanation for the negative fertility income relationship, an expla-
nation that relies purely on the random nature of abilities. Conditional on
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grandparents abilities, the model predicts that high ability parents have
fewer children because children are more costly to those parents.
Notice that optimal fertility is the lowest for high ability parents with
low ability grandparents. This is due to the fact that, with complete mar-
kets, unlucky grandparents can borrow against the income of their high
ability children which reduces the wealth of those children, and therefore
their fertility. As we show below, when markets are incomplete unlucky
grandparents cannot borrow against their childrens income and therefore
the fertility of high ability parents with low ability grandparents is higher
under incomplete markets.
Corner solutions are not only possible but likely in complete markets
models with idiosyncratic shocks. First, if children are a net nancial benet
to parents, then maximum fertility is optimal, nt = n. Second, equation (9)
can easily imply nt > n for parents whose ability is far below that of their
grandparents. As we document below, using a calibrated version of the
model, this feature of the complete markets model is problematic because it
leads to unrealistic high fertility rates for many families.
3.2.2 General equilibrium
Given optimal fertility rules n (!t 1; !t) ; let Nt+1 (!t; !t+1) be the popula-
tion at time t+1 with own type !t+1 and parental type !t: Assuming a law
of large number holds, aggregate population evolves according to:
Nt+1 (!t; !t+1) =
X
!t 1
Nt (!t 1; !t)n (!t 1; !t)M (!t+1; !t) :
LetNt 
P
!t 1
P
!t
Nt (!t 1; !t) be total population at time, t (!t 1; !t) 
Nt(!t 1;!t)
Nt
be the fraction of population of type !t and parental type !t 1;and
1 + gt  Nt+1Nt the gross growth rate of population. Then, the previous ex-
pression can be written as:
t+1 (!t; !t+1) =
1
1 + gt
X
!t 1
t (!t 1; !t)n (!t 1; !t)M (!t+1; !t) (10)
Adding across (!t; !t+1) pairs, it can be seen that 1+gt =
P
!t
P
!t 1 t (!t 1; !t)n (!t 1; !t) :
The stationary distribution  (!t 1; !t) is the invariant distribution that
solves (10).
Given that production is perishable, the equilibrium interest rate has to
equate aggregate consumption to aggregate endowments. Using the station-
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ary distribution, the equilibrium condition can be expressed asX
!0
X
!
c (!)
 
!; !0

=
X
!0
X
!

1  n  !; !0!0  !; !0 :
This equation pins down the steady state interest rate r since both c (!) and
n (!; !0) are functions of the interest rate r.
3.3 Incomplete markets
3.3.1 Recursive formulation
Consider next the case of bequests constraints of the type (6). Assume out-
put is perishable, aggregate consumption must equal aggregate production.
Alternatively, aggregate savings are zero. Moreover, savings are equal to the
total amount of bequests left by parents. Since all bequests are non-negative
then aggregate savings are zero if and only if all bequests are zero. There-
fore, in any equilibrium with bequest constraints the budget constraint (3)
simplies to:
ct
 
!t
  !t  1  nt  !t for all !t 2 
t+1 and all t  1. (11)
This is balanced budget constraint for every period and state. The lack of
intergenerational transfers signicantly simplies the problem. To study the
incomplete markets problem, we rst show that the principle of optimality
holds. Standard arguments cannot be used because the discount factor is
endogenous. Alvarez (1999) shows that the principle of optimality holds
for a dynastic version of this problem, while we show that it holds for the
household version of the problem.6
Let N^0
 
! 1

= 1; N^t
 
!t 1

=
t 1Q
j=0
nj
 
!j

for t  1: The problem can
be written in sequential form, using (11) and (4) recursively, as follows:
V 0 (!0) = sup
fN^t+1(!t 1;!t)g1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
tN^t
 
!t 1
1 "
u
 
!t
 
1  N^t+1
 
!t 1; !t

N^t (!t 1)
!!
(12)
6The analogous dynastic problem is:
U (N;!) = max
N02[0;n]
u
 
!   N 0=NN1  + E U  N 0; !0 j! :
In this problem the number of family members is a state variable, N , all members have
the same ability, !; and make the same choices. The household problem does not impose
these constraints. On problem is simpler than Alvarezs because there are no savings. But
the problem is still dynamic.
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subject to
0  N^t+1
 
!t 1; !t
  N^t  !t 1 = for all !t 1 2 
t, !t 2 
 and t  0:
The recursive formulation of this problem is:
U (!) = max
n2[0;n]
u (! (1  n)) + n1 "E U  !0 j! : (13)
The next proposition states that the principle of optimality holds for this
problem.
Proposition 4 The functional equation (13) has a unique solution, U (!).
Moreover U (!) = V 0 (!) for ! 2 
:
3.3.2 Optimal fertility
The optimality condition for fertility choices is
!u0 ((1  n)!) =  (1  ")n "E U  !0 j! : (14)
The left hand side of (14) is the marginal cost of an additional child while
the right hand side is the marginal benet. The marginal cost is the product
of the opportunity cost of raising a child, !, times the marginal utility of
consumption. The marginal benet to the parent is the discounted expected
welfare of a child, E [U (!0) j!], times the parental weight associated to the
last child, (1  ")n(!) ". Let n = n(!) be the optimal fertility rule and
c = c (!)  (1  n(!))! the optimal consumption rule.
In contrast to the complete markets case, corner solutions are not optimal
in the incomplete markets case under the assumed functional forms. Having
no children is not optimal because the marginal benet of a child is innite
while the marginal cost is nite. In particular, E [U (!0) j!] > 0 for all !
while limn!0 n  =1: Having the maximum number of children is also sub-
optimal because the marginal cost is innite when parental consumption is
zero, while the marginal benet is nite.
Consider now the relationship between fertility, n, and parental earning
ability, !. According to (14), both marginal benets (MB) and marginal
costs (MC) are a¤ected by abilities. MB increase with ! because of the
postulated intergenerational persistence of abilities: high ability parents are
more likely to have high ability children. Regarding MC, there are two ef-
fects. On one hand,MC tends to rise with ! because higher ability increases
the opportunity cost of the parental time required to raise children. On the
17
other hand, MC tends to fall because the larger the ability the smaller the
marginal utility of consumption. Given that  2 (0; 1); the rst e¤ect dom-
inates the second one so MC increases with !. The need for  2 (0; 1)
suggests a tension between the theory and the empirics since estimates of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution are typically lower than 1. But
the correct interpretation of 1= is an intergenerational elasticity of substi-
tution (IGES), one controlling inter-personal consumption smoothing rather
than intra-personal consumption smoothing (Cordoba and Ripoll 2011).
Since both MB and MC increase with !; it is not clear in principle
whether fertility increases or decreases with ability. The following proposi-
tion provides the answer in three cases: i.i.d. abilities across generations,
perfect intergenerational persistence of abilities without uncertainty and ran-
dom walk (log) abilities.7
In order to analyze the case of perfect persistence of ability, it is instruc-
tive to write the rst order condition in an alternative way. Using equation
(14) to express (13) as:
Ut = u (c (!)) +
1
1  "n (!)!u
0 (c (!)) (15)
Then use (15) to rewrite (14) as:
u0 (c (!))n (!)" = E

u0
 
c
 
!0
 !0
!

1

+
   "
1  

1

  n  !0! (16)
This equation is useful because it only requires marginal utilities, rather
than total utility as in equation (14), and corresponds to the Euler equation
of the problem describing the optimal consumption rule. Although savings
are zero in equilibrium, fertility allows individuals to smooth consumption
across generations.8
7Although a random walk does not satisfy some of the assumptions above, it helps to
develop some intuition.
8Equation (14) can also be written in the form of a more traditional Euler equation.
Let 1+ r0 be the gross return of "investing" in a child. It is given by 1+ r0  U(!0)=u0(c0)
!
.
In this expression, U(!0)=u0(c0) is the value of a new life, in terms of goods, while ! is
the cost of creating a new individual. Then (14) can be written as:
u0(c) =  (1  )n E u0(c0)  1 + r0 j! : (17)
This is an Euler equation with a discount factor  (1  )n : It suggests that optimal
fertility choices are similar to saving decisions and that children are like an asset, as
pointed out by Alvarez (1999). However, two important di¤erences with the traditional
Euler Equation are that the individual controls the discount factor and the gross return.
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Proposition 5 Persistence and the fertility-ability relationship. (i)
Fertility decreases with ability if abilities are i.i.d. across generations. In this
case n (!) satises the equation n(!)
"
(1 n(!)) = A!
 1 where A is a constant.
Furthermore, fertility is independent of ability in one of the following two
cases: (ii) M is the identity matrix (abilities are perfectly persistent and
deterministic); or (iii) ln!t = ln!t 1 + "t where "t  N(0; 2").
According to Proposition 5, fertility decreases with ability when abili-
ties are i.i.d. The intuition is that without intergenerational persistence, a
higher ability of the parent only a¤ects her or his marginal cost but not
marginal benet as E [U (!0) j!] = E [U (!0)] for all ! 2 
: On the other
extreme, fertility is independent of ability when abilities are perfectly persis-
tent across generations (cases ii and iii). This is because in those cases both
the marginal cost and marginal benet are proportional to !1 . Given
that fertility becomes independent of ability only in the extreme case of
perfect persistent, it is natural to conjecture that fertility decreases with
ability when persistence is less than perfect. We were able to conrm this
conjecture numerically but analytical solutions were not obtained.
3.3.3 General equilibrium
Denote Nt (!) the mass of population with ability !, Nt 
X
!2
Nt (!) to-
tal population, t (!) =
Nt(!)
Nt
the fraction of population with ability ! 2 

at time t; and 1 + gt =
X
!2
 n (!)t (!) the gross growth rate of popula-
tion. The initial population of di¤erent ability types fN0 (!i)gKi=1 is given.
As in Section 3.2.2., it can be shown that the law of motion for t (!i)
satises
t+1 (!j) =
1
1 + gt
X
!i2

n (!i)t (!i)M(!j ; !i) for all !j 2 
 (18)
Let  (!)  lim
t!1t (!) represents the limit distribution of abilities where
! 2 
 = f!igNi=1. Given the Assumption 1 and that n (!1)  :::  n (K) >
0, a unique limit distribution exists (see Chu and Koo 1990).
We now provide some analytical results characterizing the distribution
t; the limit distribution  and their relationship to fertility for some special
cases. Calibrated results are provided in Section 5. The following propo-
sition provides a simple but important benchmark. The rst part states
that when fertility is identical across types then  =  : the endogenous
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limit distribution of abilities equals the exogenous invariant distribution of
abilities described by equation (2). In other words, the endogenous distrib-
ution of abilities just reects the genetic distribution of abilities, what can
be termed nature rather than nurture. The second part of the proposition
shows that this results also holds when fertility rates are di¤erent across
types but there is not persistence of abilities.
Proposition 6 When  equals : Suppose one of the following two con-
ditions holds: (i) n (!) = n for all ! 2 
; or (ii) M(!0; !) is independent of
! for all !0 2 
. Then  (!) =  (!) for all ! 2 
: Moreover, if (ii) holds
then t (!) =M (!; :) for all ! 2 
 and all t  1:
The following proposition uses propositions 5 and 6 to characterize fer-
tility and the limiting ability distribution in cases of either no persistence
or perfect persistence of abilities.
Proposition 7 Persistence, fertility and ability distribution. (i) If
M(!0; !) is independent of ! then n (!) decreases with ! and t (!) =
 (!) = M (!; :) for all ! 2 
 and t  1; (ii) if M is the identity matrix
then n (!) = n for all ! 2 
 and t (!) =  (!) = 0 (!) for all ! 2 
 and
all t; (iii) if ln! follows a Gaussian random walk then n (!) = n; and given
!0 the variance of abilities diverges to 1.
In words, if childrens abilities are independent of parental abilities, then
fertility decreases with ability but the observed distribution of abilities is in-
dependent of fertility choices and determined by the Markov chain M from
the second period on. Furthermore, with certainty and perfect intergener-
ational persistence of abilities the observed distribution of abilities in any
period is identical to the initial distribution of abilities. Finally, if (log)
abilities follow a random walk then there is not limit distribution of abilities
since its variance goes to innite.
As for intermediate case of some persistence, the following Proposition
is an application of Chu and Koos (CK, 1990) Theorem 2. It states that
if the fertility of the poor, meaning the group with lowest income, is higher
than the fertility of the rest of the population then  is di¤erent from ;
and moreover,  dominates  in the rst order stochastic sense.
Proposition 8 Suppose M satises Assumption 1 and n (!1) > n (!i) = n
for all i > 1: Then
PI
i=1 
 (!i) >
PI
i=1  (!i) for all 1  I  K:
Proof. See Chu and Koo (1990, pp.1136).
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4 Welfare analysis of fertility policies
We now consider simple types of fertility policies that directly set constraints
on fertility choices. In particular, let n(!)  0 and n(!)  n be the lower
and upper bounds on fertility set by the policy. Bounds could potentially
depend on individual abilities. The motivation for the upper bound is the
one child policy. Although fertility policies are signicantly more complex
than simple bounds, the bounds capture a key essence of the intent of these
policies which is to limit or, more recently, promote fertility.
4.1 Fertility policies and income
A key aspect of fertility policies such as family planning policies is their
ability to increase the income of the poor and also, the average income of the
economy. Since income equals ! (1  n (!)) then restricting fertility in fact
increases individual income because it increases the e¤ective labor supply.
Furthermore, average earning abilities and average income are dened as:
Et =
X
!2

!t (!) ; It =
X
!2

! (1  n (!))t (!) :
These expressions shows that, in addition to increasing individual income,
fertility policies also have the potential to increase average income if those
policies also result in better distributions of abilities, t (!) ; in the rst or-
der stochastic sense. In fact, a corollary of Proposition 6 (i) and Proposition
8, is that reducing the fertility of the poor to the same level as that of others
results in a limit distribution that dominates the original distribution. More
generally, CK show that if fertility decreases with income, M satises As-
sumption 1, and the initial distribution of incomes is at its steady state level,
0 (!i) ; then a reduction in the fertility of the poor results in a sequence
of income distributions that rst order stochastically dominate 0 (!i), that
is,
PI
i=1 t (!i) <
PI
i=1 

0 (!i) for all 1  I  K and t > 0.
The positive e¤ects of family planning policies on the income of the
poor, average income and average ability are often used to provide support
for these policies. We next show that, in spite of its positive e¤ects on
income, fertility policies are welfare detrimental in our incomplete markets
economies.
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4.2 Fertility policies and individual welfare
The indirect utility U r (!) of the problem with fertility constraints solves
the Bellman equation:
U r (!) = max
n2[n(!);n(!)]
u ((1  n)!) + n1 "E U r  !0 j! : (19)
Let nr (!) denotes the corresponding optimal fertility rule. The following
proposition states that binding fertility restrictions in at least one state
reduce the indirect utility, or welfare, of all individuals even those whose
fertility is not directly a¤ected. The proposition also states that fertility
restrictions of any type (weakly) reduce the fertility of all individuals except
perhaps those whose fertility rates are at or below the lower bound.
Proposition 9 U r (!)  U(!) for all ! and it holds with strict inequality
for all ! if n(!^) > n(!^) or n(!^) < n(!^) for at least one !^ 2 
: Furthermore
nr(!) = n(!) if n(!)  n(!) and nr(!)  n(!) otherwise. In particular,
nr(!) < n(!) for all ! if n(!) > n(!) for all ! and n(!^) > n(!^) for at least
one !^ 2 
:
Proposition 9 implies that policies such as the One Child Policy, which
limits fertility of all individuals, or policies that compel individuals to in-
crease their fertility such as the leftover womenstigma in China, are detri-
mental to all individualswelfare in our incomplete markets model.
Although fertility is possibly ine¢ ciently high for some ability types and
there might be potential room for policies to improve individual welfare,
the proposition shows that policies restricting fertility choices do not help
because it restricts individuals choices without providing any compensation.
Furthermore, fertility restrictions that only a¤ect a particular group result in
lower welfare for all individuals because, regardless of current ability, there
is a positive probability that a descendant of the dynasty will fall into the
group directly a¤ected in nite time. Given that welfare of every individual
falls with fertility restrictions, the marginal benets of having children also
falls while the marginal cost remains the same. Thus fertility must fall for all
types except perhaps for those who are constrained by the policy to increase
their fertility.
4.3 Fertility policies and social welfare
Given that fertility policies reduce the welfare of all individuals, as shown in
Proposition 9, it is natural to infer that social welfare should also fall. The
22
answer, however, depends on how social welfare is dened and whether the
policy reduces or increases population. In this section we focus on fertility
policies that impose upper limits on fertility rates such as limiting the fertil-
ity of the poor or the One Child Policy. Other fertility policies like coercing
the rich to have more children and fertility related taxes/subsidies involve
more competing factors and are postponed to the quantitative exercise.
4.3.1 Total Utilitarian Social Welfare
Classical (Bentham) utilitarianism denes social welfare as the total dis-
counted welfare of all (born) individuals:9
W =
1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U(!)Nt (!) : (20)
In this formulation p(t)  0 is the weight the social planner assigns to
generation t, U (!) is the utility of an individual with ability !, and Nt (!)
is the size of population of generation t endowed with ability !: Since in-
dividuals are altruistic toward their descendants, p(t) > 0 means that the
planner gives additional weight to generation t on top of what is implied
by parental altruism. A particular case in which the planner weights only
the original generation and therefore adopts its altruistic weights is the one
with p(0) = 1 and p(t) = 0 for t > 0 :
W0 =
X
!2

U(!)N0 (!) (21)
According to Proposition 9, upper limits a¤ecting the fertility of at least
one ability group reduce fertility of all ability groups. Therefore, upper limits
on fertility unequivocally reduce population of all ability groups at all times
after time 0. Given that both population and individual welfare fall for all
ability types, we are able to show that fertility limits unequivocally decrease
social welfare if social welfare is of the classical or Benthamite utilitarian
form.
Proposition 10 Imposing upper limits on fertility choices reduces social
welfare as dened by (20).
9The results in this section are similar if the welfare of the unborn is explicitly consid-
ered as long as the unborn enjoy lower utility than the born.
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An identical result is obtained if the planner exhibits positive but dimin-
ishing returns to population, say if Nt (!) in expression (20) is replaced by
Nt (!)
1 "p where "p 2 (0; 1) : This formulation seems a natural extension of
the Barro-Becker preferences for a planner. The result does not necessarily
hold if we dene social welfare as the average, or Mills, utilitarian form as
discussed next.
4.3.2 Average Utilitarian Social Welfare
Dene average, or Mills, utilitarian social welfare as
W =
1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U(!)t (!) (22)
This denition of welfare is analogous to (20) but uses population shares,
t (!), rather than population, Nt (!) as weights. A particular case is one
where the planner cares only about steady state welfare so that p(t) = 0
for all t and lim
t!1p(t) = 1, the steady state welfare function is given as
W

=
X
!2

U(!) (!) : (23)
This denition of social welfare is the one used by CK to argue in favor of
family planning policies. It is also a commonly used criteria in social choice
theory because it avoids Parts repugnant conclusion. Notice that average
social welfare could increase even if the welfare of all individuals fall when
fertility limits are enacted. The net e¤ect depends on the relative strength
of two potentially opposite forces: on the one hand individual welfare falls
but on the other hand the distribution of abilities, , may improve. CK
assume that U(!) is invariant to the policy in place and therefore the only
consequence of the policy is to change : In that case, Proposition 8 states
that limiting the fertility of the poor improves the distribution of abilities, in
a stochastic dominance sense, and therefore increases average welfare, given
U . The following corollary summarizes CK main result.
Corollary 11 Suppose social welfare is dened by (22) where U(!) is a
non-decreasing function of ability. Furthermore, suppose M satises CSM
and fertilities are exogenously given and satisfy n (!1) > n (!i) = n for
all 1 < i  N . Then (i) reducing the fertility of the lowest ability group
increases social welfare; (ii) fertility policies that do not change the distrib-
ution of abilities do not change social welfare.
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This result by CK assumes, however, that U is invariant to the policy in
place which is not true in our endogenous fertility model. As shown above,
welfare of all individuals falls with the policy. Such reduction in individual
welfare may be strong enough to o¤set the positive e¤ects of the policy. The
following proposition shows that in fact this is possible.
Proposition 12 SupposeM(!0; !) is independent of ! for all !0 2 
. Then
upper limits on fertility choices reduce social welfare as dened by (22).
Proposition 12 relies on the earlier nding in Proposition 6 that, when
abilities are i.i.d., the distribution of abilities among the population is inde-
pendent of fertility choices and thus fully determined by the Markov matrix
M . Therefore, in the i.i.d. case the e¤ect of any fertility policy on social
welfare, as dened by (22), is only determined by its e¤ect on individual
welfare, U .
The following proposition for a deterministic case of perfect persistence
of abilities states that average utilitarian welfare unequivocally falls with
uniformfertility restrictions such as the one child policy.
Proposition 13 SupposeM is the identity matrix. Then a uniform fertility
restriction n (!) = n reduces social welfare as dened by (22).
Proposition 13 provides another example in which fertility restriction do
not a¤ect : Since in the deterministic case all ability groups have the same
fertility choices and the fertility restriction a¤ects all ability groups equally,
it follows that t = 0 for all t so that the e¤ect of the policy on social
welfare is only determined by the e¤ect on individual welfare U .
Proposition 12 and 13 formally provide analytical examples in which so-
cial welfare falls when fertility is restricted even under the notion of average
social welfare. We now turn to quantitative exercise to investigate more gen-
eral cases in which abilities are correlated but less than perfect persistent
across generations. The calibrated results suggest that fertility restricting
policies decrease social welfare in general, even when social welfare is dened
as average welfare.
5 Quantitative exploration
We now explore some of the quantitative implications of the model. While
the computation of the incomplete markets model is relatively simple, the
computation of the complete markets model is not. The reason is that
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corner solutions easily arise for standard calibrations of the income process.
In particular, equation (9) would easily result in fertility larger than the
maximum if !t 1 and !t are su¢ ciently di¤erent.
To avoid corner solutions we rst consider an example that sets a rela-
tively narrow range for the set of abilities. Although the example produces
only limited inequality, it allows us to illustrate that fertility in the in-
complete markets model may be ine¢ ciently high relative to the complete
markets version. The rest of the section uses a more realistic calibration
of the income process but provides only results for the incomplete markets
model.
5.1 Example
Suppose abilities follow a two-state Markov process characterized by [!H ; !L] =
[0:85; 1:18] and Pr (!H j!H) = Pr (!Lj!L) = 0:9; and Pr (!H j!L) = Pr (!Lj!H) =
0:1: Assume the following parameters values:  = 0:5,  = 0:2, " = 0:3, and
 = 0:3. These values are similar to the ones calibrated in the next section.
The risk free interest rate that clears the asset market in the complete mar-
kets model is 3:44. Table 1 reports steady state fertilities for the complete
and incomplete markets cases according to formulas (9) and (14). Notice
that fertility in the rst environment is a function of both grandparents
and parental abilities while in the second environment is only a function of
parental ability.
Table 1: Fertility in complete and incomplete markets models
nt = n(!t 1; !t) n(!H ; !H) n(!H ; !L) n(!L; !H) n(!L; !L)
Complete Markets 0.67 1.60 0.28 0.67
Incomplete Markets 0.58 0.69 0.58 0.69
Table 1 illustrates the result that, in presence of idiosyncratic shocks,
steady state fertility can be ine¢ ciently high when markets are incomplete.
For instance, the fertility rate of high ability parents with low ability grand-
parents under complete markets is 0:28 while the fertility of the same individ-
ual under incomplete markets is 0:58. As discussed above, when markets are
complete unlucky grandparents can borrow against the income of their high
ability children which reduces the wealth of those children, and therefore
their fertility. However, when markets are incomplete unlucky grandparents
cannot borrow against their childrens income and therefore the fertility of
high ability parents with low ability grandparents is higher under incomplete
markets. Thus, the result that policies restricting fertility rates are welfare
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detrimental is not due to fertility being always ine¢ ciently low in incom-
plete markets models. Even if fertility is ine¢ ciently high, those policies
still reduce welfare in our models.
5.2 Benchmark calibration
In this section, we use Brazilian data to calibrate the model and evaluate the
welfare e¤ects of fertility restriction policies. The use of Brazilian data takes
advantage of data assembled by Lam (1986) on the intergenerational income
process, and it corresponds to a relevant case of a developing economy with
high fertility rates. We are also interested in evaluating the potential e¤ects
of the one child policy in China, but given data limitations, Brazil in 1986
perhaps provides a reasonable approximation for China at the time of the
one child policy.
The following parameters are needed: the Markov chain of abilities M ,
ability vector ~!, curvature of the utility function ; discount factor , par-
ents degree of altruism ", and time cost of raising every child : For social
welfare calculations we also need a social planners weight on every genera-
tion p (t) :
Data on di¤erent income groups, fertility of each group, and the Markov
chain are taken from Lam (1986) who provides estimates for Brazil. Average
incomes of each of ve income groups are
 !
I = [553; 968; 1640; 2945; 10991] :
They describe income classes of Brazilian male household heads aged from 40
to 45 in 1976. Average fertility of each income group are !n = [6:189; 5:647; 5:065; 4:441; 3:449] =2.
We divide fertility by two to obtain fertility per-adult. Using income and fer-
tility data, we calculate earning abilities of di¤erent groups as !i =
I(!i)
1 n(!i)
and normalize the lowest ability to be 1. The Markov chain provided by
Lam is:
M =
266664
0.50 0.25 0.15 0.10 0.05
0.25 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.10
0.15 0.20 0.35 0.20 0.20
0.05 0.10 0.20 0.35 0.25
0.05 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.40
377775
This chain does not satisfy the CSM property required by Assumption 1,
but it implies certain level of earning persistency across generations since
its diagonal elements dominate their corresponding o¤-diagonal elements.
We also considered a Markov chain provided by Chu and Koo (1990) that
satises CSM, and obtain similar results.
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Initial population is normalized to 1 and the initial distribution of abil-
ities, 0; is approximated by the stationary distribution implied by M and !n .
Our discount factor  and altruistic parameter, ", are calibrated to match
altruism function in Manuelli and Seshadri (2009) (MS henceforth). Their
altruistic function in a life cycle model takes the form e Be 0+1 lnn where
0; 1; and  are set to be 0.24, 0.65, 0.04, respectively. The child-bearing
age B is 25. So the proper mappings from our parameters to theirs are
 = e Be 0 and 1   " = 1; which solve our  and " as 0:29 and 0:35,
respectively.
Other two key parameters are the curvature of the utility function  and
the time cost of raising every child : We originally set  to be 0:62; the
one used by MS and calibrate  to match the mean of fertility data because
time costs are not provided by MS. But the simulated dispersion of fertility
at steady state is way below that of the Brazilian fertility data. To better
t the data, we calibrate  and  to jointly match the mean and standard
deviation of the fertility data. The calibrated values are  = 0:526 and
 = 0:243.  is below but not far away from the one used in MS. Under
this values, the mean and standard deviation of steady state fertility in the
model are 2:653 and 0:433 respectively, which are close to the targets 2:648
and 0:416 in the data.
Our parameter of time cost of raising a child approximately prescribes
a maximum number of 8 children per couple, or that each parent spends
around 12% of their time on every child. For the social planners weights
we assume p (t) = 
t with  = 0:1: Remember that  = 0:0 means that
the planner values future generations just as much as the original genera-
tion does. The set of parameters chosen for the benchmark exercises are
summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Parameters
Parameters Concept Values
 individual discount factor 0.29
" altruistic parameter 0.35
 elasticity of substitution 0.526
 per child time cost 0.243
 weight of social planner 0.1
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5.3 Results
The simulated model replicates a negative relationship between fertility and
ability similar to the Brazilian data10. As shown in Figure 1, fertility per
household falls from around 6 to 2.8 as earning abilities increase from 1 to
8.5. This negative relationship arises from the interplay of two opposite
forces. On the one hand, individuals with higher abilities have a larger op-
portunity cost of raising children. On the other hand, they enjoy a larger
benet of having children when abilities are intergenerationally persistent.
The e¤ect of ability on the marginal cost dominates as long as the intergen-
erational persistence of ability is less than perfect and the IGES is larger
than 1.
We now use the model to perform policy experiments. First, we study
policies that directly restrict or encourage fertility. Second, we consider the
e¤ects of taxes and/or subsidies on family size.
5.4 Policy experiments
5.4.1 Restricting fertility
Consider rst the e¤ects of policies limiting the fertility rate to be no more
than bn children, where bn < n. We have proved that these policies reduce
total utilitarian social welfare in Proposition 10 and reduce average social
welfare in certain cases, in Propositions 12 and 13. We now consider average
social welfare in an empirically plausible case.
The rst panel of Figure 2 shows the e¤ect of limiting fertility on steady
state average ability, !; and average income, y. These two variables increase
as the upper limit on fertility decreases. As predicted by CK, tighter fertil-
ity limits, which a¤ect lower income groups more severely, increase average
income and ability. These results seemingly provide support to family plan-
ning programs. However, they ignore the negative welfare consequences of
limiting family size. The second panel of Figure 2 shows that steady state
average social welfare, W

, average social welfare of all generations, W , to-
tal social welfare of the initial generation, W0, and total social welfare of
all generations, W , consistently increase as the upper limit on fertility is
relaxed.
Knowing that policies limiting fertility reduce social welfare, we also sim-
ulate policies that impose lower limits on fertility rates. An example of this
policy is recent e¤orts by the Chinese government to induce educated unwed
10By construction, our calibration targets the mean and dispersion of fertilities but not
the sign of the relationship between fertility and income.
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women older than 27 to marry by stigmatizing them as "leftover women".
The objective of these e¤orts seems to be twofold. To reduce pressures due
to sex imbalances brought about by the One Child Policy, and to improve
the quality of the workforce. These type of policies disproportionately a¤ect
the rich, or high ability individuals, because their unconstrained fertility is
typically lower. The rst panel of gure 3 shows that this policy improves
average ability since high ability individuals have proportionally more high
ability children. On the other hand, the policies reduce average income
because individuals, especially those with high abilities, spend more time
raising children and this e¤ect dominates the e¤ect of an improved ability
distribution.
The second panel of gure 3 illustrates the impact of setting lower limits
on four social welfare measures. In general all four welfare measures exhibit
a decreasing trend as the lower bound increases although there are certain
ranges in which total welfare increase slightly. For example, total social
welfare has a tiny increase by 0.08 as the lower bound increases from 5 to
6. Further increases in the lower bound, say above 6, results in all welfare
measures eventually plunging.
These results conrm the main message of the paper: in general fertility
restrictions, on the poor or other groups, do not have strong theoretical
support for improving social welfare.
5.4.2 Taxes and subsidies on fertility
We next study the e¤ect on social welfare of taxes and/or subsidies on fer-
tility while preserving a government balanced budget. Specically, consider
a subsidy, s, that helps parents o¤set the costs of raising children as is the
spirit of recent policies in Europe. We also allow s to be negative in order to
consider policies deterring parents from having children. The subsidy (tax)
is nanced by a lump sum tax (transfer) T (s) imposed on every individual.
Under this policy, individuals budget constraint becomes
c+ (  s)!n  !   T (s) :
The governmentsbudget constraint is
T (s) = s
X
!
!n (!) (!) :
Figure 4 shows the e¤ects of this policy on fertility and individual welfare.
The horizontal axis of every panel is the subsidy, s; ranging from -10% to
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10%. The range of subsidies is such that they do not fully compensate for
the cost of raising children, s < : The rst panel shows that fertility rates
decrease as taxes increase, say as s drops from 0 to -0.1, while the e¤ect is
ambiguous for subsidies.
The ambiguous impact of a subsidy on fertility is because of the income
e¤ects of the lump sum transfer. In presence of taxes or subsidies the mar-
ginal cost of an additional child becomes (  s)!1   1  (  s)n  T (s)! 1 
while the marginal benet is  (1  ")n "E [U (!0) j!]. Marginal benet also
depends on s since U (!) does although it is not clear from the expression
how it moves with s: For marginal cost, when s > 0, an increase in s de-
creases the marginal cost if T (s) is unchanged. But the lump sum tax T (s)
imposed on everyone increases with s, which causes marginal cost to go up.
The e¤ect of T (s) on marginal cost is small for high ability types, so for
them the e¤ect of s onMC tends to dominate that of T (s) while the inverse
tends to be true for low ability individuals. This explains what happens in
the rst panel of Figure 4 where fertility increases for the two highest ability
types and decreases for other types as s increases. This is because MC of
the two highest ability types decrease much faster than all other typesMC
as subsidy increases or possibly other typesMC increase with the subsidy.
Likewise, when s < 0; s becomes more negative as taxes increase, MC of
high ability types increase more than that of low ability types. The nu-
merical results show that everyones fertility falls as taxes increase. Panel
2 shows a mixed policy consequences on individual welfare. A high sub-
sidy benets high ability individuals while harms other types, especially low
ability individuals.
Figure 5 shows the e¤ects on social welfare, dened as steady state av-
erage social welfare. Social welfare could be improved only when there is a
very low tax, e.g. up to 2% of the time cost of raising every child. Otherwise,
it is neither improved by taxes nor by subsidies.
5.4.3 Robustness checks
We now report the results of various robustness checks. For this purpose
we change one parameter at a time while keeping all the other parameters
at their benchmark values and study the policy e¤ects of reducing fertility
on various welfare measures. We nd that the qualitative results obtained
above are mostly robust for reasonable parameters although there exist pa-
rameters for which average steady state welfare, W

; improves with fertility
restrictions. The set of parameters studied is further restricted by the need
to have nite utility and concavity.
31
We nd that the results are robust to setting  anywhere in the range
0:45 to 111. When  2 [0:35; 0:45] ; fertility restrictions could moderately
improves steady state average welfare W

but only when the limit is at a
very high level, as illustrated in the rst panel of gure 6 for  = 0:4: The
intuition for the increase in W

is the following. First, a small  implies
a high IGES and therefore a small gain of smoothing consumption through
fertility choices. Thus fertility restrictions when  is small are less harmful
to individual welfare in which case peoples incentive to smooth consumption
through fertility is relatively weak. Second, W

could be slightly increased
by a tighter fertility restriction only in the area near the unconstrained
fertility choice of the low ability group. In that case, only fertility choices of
low ability individuals are directly a¤ected. Due to their high fertility rate
and low welfare, tighter restrictions could signicantly improve distribution
without hurting other types. So the e¤ect on distribution dominates that on
individual welfare. In summary, when  is low fertility restrictions starting
from a high level may increase average steady state welfare because they
have a minor impact on individual welfare but relatively large e¤ect on
distribution.
The results are robust to setting  in the range [0:27; 0:4]12. Similar with
; as  is below 0.27, W

may increase when the limit on fertility is large
enough as illustrated in the second panel of gure 6 for the case  = 0:2. A
low  means that parents care little about future generations. As a response,
they would have fewer kids, more consumption and lower marginal utility
of consumption. In this case, fertility restrictions have a minor e¤ect on
individual welfare and, as a result, the change of the ability distribution is
the dominant e¤ect determining social welfare. However, this low degree of
altruism also implies that the model predicts counterfactually low fertility
rates. In particular, the simulated unrestricted fertility range is between 1.14
to 3.12 per household which is below the minimum of Brazilians fertility
data, 3.449. A similar result is obtained when " is particularly large, as
illustrated in the third panel for " = 0:52:
We also performed robustness checks for the cost of raising children
 over the feasible range (0:15; 0:32). The lower bound is required by the con-
cavity of utility function while the upper bound is required to guarantee the
labor supply to be nonnegative. The result is robust to all  2 (0:19; 0:32).
When  is lower than 0:19, fertility of everyone is too high and population
11To guarantee the concavity of the utility function and nonnegative utility, 1 >  > "
is needed.
12Boundedness of utility requires  < 1 ". Given  = 0:243 and " = 0:35; the upper
bound for  is 0:4 .
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becomes innite in the long run and total social welfare is not well dened.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies optimal fertility choices and fertility policies when chil-
drens earnings are random and parents are altruistic. We characterize equi-
librium allocations in endowment economies with complete and incomplete
markets. In the complete markets case, consumption and fertility are not
deterministic as is the case when fertility is exogenous. This novel result is a
natural consequence of a key insight provided by Barro and Becker (1989):
when fertility is endogenous consumption is proportional to the net cost of
raising a child. We generalize this result to the case of idiosyncratic shocks.
Our analysis shows that the incomplete markets models can replicate
various features of the evidence on fertility and income distribution. For
example, fertility decreases with ability and social mobility occurs in equi-
librium. The negative relationship between ability and fertility arises in
this framework due to the combination of four factors: incomplete markets,
time cost of raising children, less than perfect persistence of abilities and an
intergenerational elasticity of substitution larger than 1.
We further show that incomplete markets could lead to ine¢ ciently high
fertility rates when children are a net nancial burden to parents. However,
this feature of the equilibrium allocation does not imply that restricting fer-
tility is welfare improving. On the contrary, we nd that fertility restrictions
are detrimental to every individuals welfare, even to those whose fertility
choices are not directly a¤ected, and therefore detrimental to social welfare
if welfare is dened as classical (Bentham) utilitarianism. If social welfare is
dened as average (Mills) utilitarianism, then fertility restrictions may im-
prove social welfare but only if the distribution of abilities improves strongly.
We also perform policy experiments using calibrated version of the model.
These experiments suggest that, in general, fertility policies such as taxes
or subsidies that a¤ect the cost of raising children do not increase social
welfare.
Our models abstracts from a number of aspects that are potentially
important for fertility decisions such as bequests and human capital accu-
mulation. Liao (2013) provides a model with human capital and nd similar
results using a calibrated deterministic model. We are extending our results
to production economies in ongoing work (Cordoba et al. 2014).
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Appendix
Ine¢ ciently high fertility in a closed economy
Section 2 shows that fertility could be ine¢ ciently high in a small-open
incomplete-markets economy. We now show that a similar could be obtained
in a closed economy. Suppose the production function is f(k; l) where k is
capital and l is labor. In a closed economy, interest rates and wages are
given by
rt = f1 (bt; 1  nt)   and wt = f2 (bt; 1  nt) .
where  is the rate of depreciation. Substituting out prices, the rst order
condition with respect to fertility becomes
u0 (ct) [f2 (bt; lt)+ bt+1]  0 (nt)Ut+1 (bt+1) (24)
Furthermore, the corresponding Euler equation is
u0 (ct)nt   (nt)u0 (ct+1) (f1 (bt+1; lt+1) + 1  )
If bequest constraints do not bind, then steady state fertility is determined
by
1 =  (f1 (b; 1  n) + 1  )n " (25)
If bequest constraint binds, then interior solution of fertility is determined
by (24). The following proposition provides a case in which steady state
fertility is larger when bequest constraints binds.
Proposition A.1. Assume the economy is closed and f (k; l) = Ak + Bl
where A; B > 0: If the marginal productivity of capital A is large
enough such that (1 ")1  (A+ 1  )" > 1 +  "1 " 1, then steady
state fertility when the constraint b b binds is higher than the un-
constrained fertility level.
Proof. Equation (24) at steady state, together with the budget constraint
and equilibrium prices results in
u0 (c) (f2 (b; l)+ b) =
0 (n)
1   (n) [f (b; 1  n) + (1  ) b  nb]
u0 (c)
1   :
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Using the specic production function, utility function and altruistic func-
tion specied above and collect terms, this equation becomes
B =
 (1  ")
1   [B + (A+ 1  ) b]n
 "   b  (b+B)    "
1  n
1 "
=
 (1  ")
1   Bn
 " + b

 (1  ")
1   (A+ 1  )n
 "   1     "
1  n
1 "

(26)
 B   "
1  n
1 ":
Denote the right hand side of this equation byRHS (n) :Notice thatRHS0 (n) <
0; lim
n!0
RHS (n) =1; and lim
n!1RHS (n) =  1: An interior solution for fer-
tility exists if and only if RHS
 
1


< B; e.g.
1 +
   "
1  
" 1 >
 (1  ")
1   (A+ 1  )
"  B1  
" 1
b
:
By the assumption, the term in the square bracket of (26) is positive. As
a result, an exogenous increase in b increases the right hand side but does
not a¤ect the left hand side, and thus leads to a bigger steady state fertility.
Hence if b is restricted to be higher than the unconstrained optimal choice
b, e.g. b <b, then the steady state fertility in the unconstrained case
(complete markets) is smaller than that in the constrained case (incomplete
markets).
Proof of Proposition 1. For the case when (1 + r)! > !, see Barro
and Becker (1989). In this proof, we focus on the case (1 + r)! < !: First
order conditions for bequests and fertility are:
u0 (ct)nt = (nt)U 0t+1 (bt+1)
u0 (ct) (! + bt+1)  0 (nt)Ut+1 (bt+1) with equality if nt < n:
0 (0) = 1 excludes the possibility of zero children. Using the envelope
condition U 0t (bt) = u0 (ct) (1 + r) ; the rst condition with respect to bequest
becomes:
u0 (ct)nt = (nt)u0 (ct+1) (1 + r)
Therefore,
Ut (bt) = u (ct) +  (nt)Ut+1 (bt+1)
 u (ct) +  (nt)
0 (nt)
u0 (ct) (! + bt+1)
= u (ct) +
 (nt)
0 (nt)nt
u0 (ct) (! + (1 + r) bt   ct)
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Forward this inequality one period and use the specic functional forms for
utility and altruistic functions to obtain
Ut+1 (bt+1)  u (ct+1) +  (nt+1)
0 (nt+1)nt+1
u0 (ct+1) (! + (1 + r) bt+1   ct+1)
= u0 (ct+1)
1
1  "

   "
1  ct+1 + (1 + r) bt+1 + !

> u0 (ct+1)
1
1  " (1 + r) (! + bt+1)
= u0 (ct)
1
0 (nt)
(! + bt+1)
for all nt: The last inequality sign is due to the assumption that (1 + r)! <
!: Hence Ut+1 (bt+1) 0 (nt) > u0 (ct) (! + bt+1) for all nt 2 [0; n] implies
nt = n is optimum. Consumption growth follows from the Euler equation.
Proof of Proposition 3. When contingent assets are available, rst order
condition to fertility nt is"
!t +
KX
i=1
q(!t; !i)bt+1(!
t; !i)
#
u0 (ct) =  (1  ")n "t Et

Vt+1
 
bt+1;!
t+1
 j!t
(27)
where consumption is given by (7)
ct = !t (1  nt) + bt   nt
KX
i=1
q(!t; !i)bt+1(!
t; !i)
rst order condition to bt+1(!t; !i) :
u0 (ct) q(!t; !i)nt = n1 "t M (!i; !t)
@Vt+1
 
bt+1;!
t+1

@bt+1
which together with envelop condition
@Vt(bt;!t)
@bt
= u0 (ct) and the actuarially
fair price of bt+1(!t; !i) gives the Euler equation
u0 (ct) = n "t (1 + r)u
0 (ct+1) (28)
Notice that all children from the same family enjoy the same consumption
which is independent of !t+1. Substituting (27) into the objective function
and use the budget constraint,
Vt
 
bt;!
t

= u0 (ct)

ct (   ")
(1  ) (1  ") +
1
1  " (!t + bt)

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Forward this equation by one period, then use it and (28) to rewrite (27) as,
!t (1 + r)+(1 + r)
KX
i=1
q(!t; !i)bt+1(!
t; !i) =
   "
1  ct+1+E

bt+1(!
t; !i)j!t

+E (!t+1j!t)
After some manipulations, the consumption of every child endowed with
ability !0 given parental ability ! is
ct+1 = c (!t) =
1  
   " [!t (1 + r)  E (!t+1j!t)]
for all t and !t. Furthermore, using (28) fertility can be solved as:
nt = n (!t 1; !t) = 
1
" (1 + r)
1
"

!t 1 (1 + r)  E (!tj!t 1)
!t (1 + r)  E (!t+1j!t)

"
When !t (1 + r) < E (!t+1j!t), the proof follows the same logic with the
second part of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. We rst show that there exists a solution U ()
that solves the functional equation (13). Dene a set of mappings.
S = fU : 
! Rj kUk Mg
where M = u(!K)
1 " 1 , and k  k is the sup norm. S is a complete metric space.
Dene operator T as
TU (!)  max
0 n  1

u ((1  n)!) + n1 "E U  !0 j! (29)
for all ! 2 
 and U 2 S. Given U () and !, the right hand side of (29) has
a solution that attains the maximum. First show that T is a contraction. It
su¢ ces to show that T satises two properties, monotonicity and discount-
ing. Standard argument can show that given U and ~U 2 S satisfying U
(!)  ~U (!) for all ! 2 
, TU (!)  T ~U (!) for all ! 2 
. The following
arguments prove discounting property holds. For any given constant b,
T (U (!) + b) = max
0 n  1

u ((1  n)!) + n1 "E U  !0+ bj!
 max
0 n  1

u ((1  n)!) + n1 "E U  !0 j!+ b 1

1 "
= TU (!) + " 1b
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" 1 < 1 by assumption. By Contraction Mapping Theorem, there exists
a unique xed point U : 
 ! R that solves the functional equation TU =
U . The existence of a solution
U () has been proved. Next we show U (!0) = V 0 (!0) for all !0 2 
; that
is to show U (!0) is the supremum of the sequential problem (12) for any
given !0 = !0.
U (!0) = max
n2[0; 1

]
u (!0 (1  n)) + n1 "E0 [U (!1) j!0]
> u (!0 (1  n0 (!0))) + E0
 
n0 (!0)
1 " u
 
!1
 
1  n1
 
!1

+2n0 (!0)
1 "E0n1
 
!1
1 "
E1 [U (!2) j!1]
!
>   
> E0
TX
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
nj
 
!j
1 "
u
 
!t
 
1  nt
 
!t

+ T+1E0
TY
j=0
nj
 
!j
1 "
U (!T+1)
for all feasible plan

nt
 
!t
	1
t=0
. Let
 1Q
j=0
nj
 
!j
1 "
= 1. The last term
T+1
TY
j=0
nj
 
!j
1 "
U (!T+1) 
 
" 1
T+1 u (!K)
1  " 1
The right hand side of this inequality converges to 0 as T goes to innite.
Hence for all feasible plan

nt
 
!t
	1
t=0
U (!0) > E0
1X
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
nj
 
!j
1 "
u
 
!t
 
1  nt
 
!t

(30)
Given " > 0, choosing a sequence of positive real numbers ftg1t=1 such thatP1
t=0
 
" 1
t
t  ": Let n (!t) be the solution that attains U (!t), then
for all t
U (!t) < u (!t (1  n (!t))) + n (!t)1 "Et [U (!t+1) j!t] + t
Starting from period 0, iteratively substituting the value function U (!t+1)
into the above inequality shows that for all !0;
U (!0) < E0
TX
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
n (!j)1 " u (!t (1  n (!t))) + T+1E0
TY
j=0
n (!j)1 " U (!T+1)
+ E0
TX
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
n (!j)1 " t
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The choice of ftg guarantees that the last term is no more than " as T !1.
We have shown that
lim
T!1
T+1E0
TY
j=0
n (!j)1 " U (!T+1) = 0
Hence for any given " > 0, there exists a feasible plan

nt
 
!t
	1
t=0
=
fn (!t)g1t=0 such that
U (!0) < E0
TX
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
n (!j)1 " u (!t (1  n (!t))) + " (31)
By (30) and (31),
U (!0) = sup
fnt(!t)g1t=02[0; 1 ]
E0
1X
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
nj
 
!j
1 "
u
 
!t
 
1  nt
 
!t

= sup
fN^t+1(!t 1;!t)g1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
ttN^
 
!t 1
1 "
u
 
!t
 
1  N^t+1
 
!t 1; !t

N^t (!t 1)
!!
Therefore
U (!0) = V
 (!0)
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) In this case, equation (14) can be written
as n(!)
"
(1 n(!)) = A!
 1 where A = (1 ") E [u (!
0)] is a constant. Using the
implicit function theorem, it follows that n0 (!) =   (1 )=!"
n(!)
+ 
1 n(!)
< 0: (ii) In
deterministic case, !0 = !: Equation (16) simplies to:
n" = 

1

+
   "
1  

1

  n

(32)
The left hand side of equation (32) is strictly increasing in n while the right
hand side is strictly decreasing in n. Obviously n > 0. An interior solution
with n < 1= exists since 1 " > . (iii) Let n denotes the optimal fertility
given !. Plug functional form of u () into equation (15)
U (!) = h (n)!1  (33)
where
h (n)  1
1   (1  n
)1  +
1
1  "n
 (1  n)  (34)
42
We make a guess on the value function and let it take the form: U (!) =
A!1  where A is a constant, independent of !: Equating this guess with
(33) results in:
A = h (n) (35)
Thus, in order for A to be independent of !; we must verify that the results
n is independent of !: Notice that,
E

U
 
!0
 j! = E A!01 j! = A!1 e (1 )22"2
The last equality holds because the assumption that !0 is lognormal distrib-
uted with ln! and " as the mean and variance of ln!0: Plug this equality
into (14) to obtain:
 (1  n)  !1  = A (1  ")n "e
(1 )22"
2 !1 
! cancels out of this equation and therefore n is independent of ! conrming
our guess. This expression together with (34) and (35) gives a rule to solve
the optimal fertility n.
 (1  )
 (1  ")n " e
  (1 )
22"
2 = 1  n + n

1  " (1  )
Manipulate terms
 (1  )n"
 (1  ")

e 
(1 )22"
2   n1 "

= 1  n
The solution of n does not depend on ! which conrms the guess on U (!).
In case (ii) and (iii), fertility is independent of ability.
Proof of Poposition 6. (i) If fertility is exogenously the same for every
individual,
Nt+1 = Nt
X
!i2

nt (!i) = Ntn
By equation (18),
t+1 (!j) =
nNt
Nt+1
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i) =
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i)
Taking limit to both sides of the expression with , we get
 (!j) = lim
t!1
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i) =
X
!i2

 (!i)M(!j ; !i)
43
Hence  () =  () is the invariant distribution of M: (ii) M( ; !i) is inde-
pendent of !i implies M(!j ; !i) =M(!j ; :) for every !j 2 
: By (18),
t+1 (!j) =
M(!j ; :)
Nt+1
X
!i2

n (!i)t (!i)Nt
=M (!j ; :) =
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; :)
for all t  0; these equalities imply t+1 (!j) =
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i) and
hence  (!j) = t+1 (!j) =  (!j) =M (!j ; :) for all !j :
Proof of Proposition 7. Part (i) directly applies Proposition 5(i) and
Proposition 6 (ii). For part (ii), we can apply Proposition 5 (ii), in which
fertility is independent of ability when M is identity. We use this result to
prove the distribution of every period as well as the limit distribution is the
same with the initial one.
t+1 (!j) =
Nt
Nt+1
X
!i2

n (!i)t (!i)M(!j ; !i)
=
Ntn
Nt+1
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i)
=
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i) = t (!j)
The last equality holds because M is identity matrix. Therefore  (!) =
t (!) = 0 (!) for all ! and all t. Part (iii) follows Proposition 5 (iii). The
conditional variance of ln!t diverges to innite because ln!t = ln!0+
tP
i=1
"i;
E (ln!tj!0) = ln!0; V ar (ln!tj!0) = t22" and limt!1 V ar (ln!tj!0) =1:
Proof of Proposition 9. Notice that
U (!) = max
nt2[0;1=]
u ((1  n)!) + n1 "E U  !0 j!
 max
[n
¯
(!);n(!)]
u ((1  n)!) + n1 "E U  !0 j! := U1  !0
 max
[n
¯
(!);n(!)]
u ((1  n)!) + n1 "E U1  !0 j! := U2  !0
::
 max
[n
¯
(!);n(!)]
u ((1  n)!) + n1 "E U r  !0 j! = U r  !0
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where the rst inequality is strict if a constraint is binding for any particular
!; the remaining inequalities follow from the contraction mapping recursion,
and the nal inequality uses the contraction mapping theorem. Furthermore,
a strict inequality for a particular ! translates into a strict inequality for
all !0s since M is a regular Markov chain meaning that, regardless of initial
ability there is positive probability that someone in the dynasty will reach
a binding state in nite time. The second part of the proposition follows
because fertility restrictions do not change the marginal costs of having
children but it decreases the marginal benets by reducing U (!) for all !
(see equation (14)). Hence an upper bound of fertility makes people have
fewer children than the unrestricted case as long as fertility upper bounds
a¤ect at least one of those types.
Proof of Proposition 10. Let N rt (!) be the size of population with
ability ! at time t in presence of fertility upper limits. By Proposition 9,
for all !j
N1 (!j) =
X
!i2

n (!i)N0 (!i)M(!j ; !i)

X
!i2

nr (!i)N
r
0 (!i)M(!j ; !i) = N
r
1 (!j)
where initial population is not a¤ected by policies N0 (!i) = N r0 (!i). Given
the inequality N1 (!j)  N r1 (!j), an inductive argument shows
Nt+1 (!j) =
X
!i2

n (!i)Nt (!i)M(!j ; !i) 
X
!i2

nr (!i)N
r
t (!i)M(!j ; !i) = N
r
t+1 (!j)
for all !j and all t  0. Apply this result,
W r
 
p

=
1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U
r(!)N rt (!)

1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U(!)N
r
t (!)

1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U(!)Nt (!) =W
 
p

Proof of Proposition 12. When M (; !) is independent of !, the proof
of Proposition 6 (ii) gives
t+1 (!j) =M(!j ; :) for all t  0
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Initial ability distribution 0 (!) is given and not a¤ected by the policy in
place. So restriction of a fertility upper bound only reduces individual utility
by Proposition 9 but does not a¤ect the ability distribution of any period.
It decreases social welfare dened by (22).
Proof of Proposition 13. This Proposition relies on Proposition 7 (ii)s
results, n (!) = n and t (!) =  (!) = 0 (!) when M is an identity.
Similar with Proposition 12, restriction does not alter distribution, which
together with Proposition 9, nishes the proof.
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Figure 1. Fertility versus Earning Abilities
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Figure 2. Policy Effects of Reducing Fertility
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Figure 3. Policy Effects of Raising Fertility
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Figure 4. Policy Effects of Taxes and Subsidies
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Figure 5. Effects of Taxes and and Subsidies on Steady State Average Social Welfare
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Figure 6. Robustness Checks
